In recent decades, the United States’
foreign policy has exhibited a frequent pattern of intervention in failing and
weak states. Notable since the end of the Cold War, it has been made apparent
that the potential threats of failing states is larger than that of nations of
independent, more powerful nations. The threat of failing states to breed
terrorism, neglect human rights, and fail to uphold implementations of basic environmental
policy and disease control are some of the main problems that attract interest
from the United States. This goal of the United States’ foreign policy, to
harness these developing, weak nations, was widely supported by government
decision makers in the 90’s, however, recent intervention in states of the
Middle East has brought people to question weather or not the intervention in
failing states should be a foreign policy goal that the United States continues
to display.
Directly after the end of the Cold
War, the United States was viewed as the sole super power. After their
communist advocating foes and all their children-states began to crumble, the
United States had a seemingly overflow of power that they could potentially
wield upon weaker states of interest which could in turn create advantages
economically and militarily. Support of this policy, which really didn’t even
yield any textbook, concrete successes, only increased after 9/11 when it
became apparent that the most dangerous states to the United States were not
large, capable nations of the world, but rather weak and failing states. These
states, often located in Africa and the Middle East, were quickly realized to
be harbors of terrorism, which was now clearly a threat to United States
security. It was at this time that intervention of what we considered failing
states was widely supported and deemed necessary. However, just a decade later,
intervention in the same region of similar failing states is beginning to be
thought twice about. Today, the years of intervention in Afghanistan and Iraq
are criticized regularly. Support for continued investment, militarily, in
these places has dropped significantly since those months following 9/11. The
amount of money the United States has sent, along with the United States human
and financial military investment, has been a reason for lost support of
intervention in these places. Instances like Afghanistan and Iraq, both of
which exhibit characteristics of a failing state, and the mission disasters of
Somalia and similar countries, which bring back the same questions asked during
the years in Vietnam, back the notion that maybe the US should take a break
from entering these weak states.
It seems as though there will
always be failing states for the US to intervene. The current situation of
civil war and insecurity in Somalia would undoubtedly have received US
intervention fifteen or even ten years ago. But after the questionable
involvement in similar states in the Middle East over the past decade, actions
made toward Syria may be different. How would involvement in the Syria by the
US be advantageous to the US? How could we be sure that mistakes made in
Afghanistan and other weak nations don’t happen again in Syria? Can the United
States afford to intervene in Syria? These questions, in regard to recent intervention of failing states direct me to think Syria is not worth it. Syria and a few other countries are the
latest failing states that the United States has had it’s eye on in recent
years. But this time, I think the US should back down and see what happens
should they not intervene in a failing state of the Middle East. Should the US
not like the results, investment in Syria and like places can be discussed, but
for now, it think it would be wise economically and considered popular not to
jump into yet another failing state which holds the potential to again hurt us
more than it’s helped.
Source: http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/140347/michael-j-mazarr/the-rise-and-fall-of-the-failed-state-paradigm